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Abstract 
Inspired by recent research showing that liars are reluctant to include details they think are 
verifiable in their accounts, we explored in two studies (N = 125; N = 105) whether 
participants who report fabricated symptoms of ill-health (‘malingerers’) present fewer 
verifiable details than participants who report genuine ill-health symptoms. In Study 1, 
participants were instructed to describe a typical day on which they had experienced a 
genuine or malingered symptom of ill-health. Truth tellers’ statements included significantly 
higher proportions of verifiable details concerning the reported symptoms than malingerers’ 
statements. Compared with truth tellers, malingerers generated longer statements with more 
unverifiable details. In Study 2, we informed participants that their statements may be 
assessed for verifiable or checkable details. Malingerers referred interviewers to ‘false’ 
witnesses to provide checkable information and differences between malingerers and truth 
tellers in statement length, and checkable and uncheckable details were no longer significant. 
The utility and implications of the verifiability approach to detection of malingering for 
physical symptoms are discussed. 
Keywords: The Verifiability Approach, malingering, detection of deception, physical 
symptoms, symptoms report. 
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The Verifiability Approach to Detect Malingering of Physical Symptoms 
Fabrication of physical symptoms in a medico-legal context burdens the health care 
system and ultimately may harm the care that genuine patients deserve (Bianchini, Greve, & 
Glynn, 2005). Thus, it is important to develop tools and strategies that can help in identifying 
people who fabricate (‘malinger’) symptoms of ill health. Malingering is defined as the 
intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated symptoms motivated by external 
incentives. The incentives may consist of financial rewards gained through personal injury 
litigation or workers’s compensation procedures (McDermott & Feldman, 2007), or reduced 
legal responsibility (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 739). It is difficult to 
determine on what scale malingering occurs, because ‘successful’ malingerers remain 
undetected (Resnick, West, & Payne, 2008). However, a conservative estimate is that, for 
example,  20% of chronic pain patients exaggerate their symptoms (Greve, Ord, Bianchini, & 
Curtis, 2009), while in cases of mild head injury and chronic fatigue prevalence rates of 
malingering are an estimated 35% (Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002). 
The most frequently used methods for the detection of malingering involve examining 
intentional underperformance on simple memory tasks (e.g., Iverson & Binder, 2000) or 
examining over-reporting of physical or psychological symptoms (Merten, Merckelbach, 
Giger, & Stevens, 2016).  Such tests are called Symptom Validity Tests (SVTs) and have 
shown to be useful in a forensic setting (see Sleep, Petty, & Wygant, 2015; Bianchini, 
Mathias, & Greve, 2001), but less so in a medical setting (Schoenberg, Dorr, & Morgan, 
2003; Roger, Sewell, & Salekin, 1994). 
In general, somatic symptoms such as pain have been scarcely investigated in 
malingering research. Pain is a reliable concomitant of many physical symptoms, but research 
so far has failed to design specific methods to detect malingering of pain (Greve, Bianchini, & 
Brewer, 2013; Fishbain, Cutler, Rosomoff, & Rosomoff, 1999). One difficulty in detecting 
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THE VERIFIABILITY OF MALINGERED SYMPTOMS 4 
fabrication of physical symptoms such as pain is that genuine symptoms do fluctuate over 
time in intensity and durability (Fishbain et al., 1999). Malingers can therefore report about 
their genuine ‘bad’ moments from the past, as if they are still ongoing. Another difficulty is 
that it is impossible to quantify pain with methods that are independent of patients’ self-
reports (McDermott & Feldman, 2007). Finally, almost everyone is familiar with pain as a 
symptom and therefore most malingerers are likely to know what kind of sensations should be 
reported to appear convincing, which impedes the detection of malingering in this domain 
(Hamilton & Feldman, 2001). 
Given these considerations, there is a need for novel malingering detection methods 
that will not just focus on memory functioning and/or psychopathology, but on the verbal 
details of patients’ symptoms report. One recent study that addressed this issue in a systematic 
fashion is that of Akehurst, Easton, Fuller, Drane, Kuzmin, and Litchfield, (2015). These 
researchers employed a combination of criteria of different verbal lie detection methods, such 
as Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA; see Blandon-Gitlin, Pezdek, Lindsay, & Hagen, 
2009; Steller & Kohnken, 1989) and Reality Monitoring (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981; see 
Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, Broers, & Merckelbach, 2013) to identify exaggerated symptoms after 
exposure to an experimental stressor. Generally, evaluators who used these methods were 
better in discriminating between truth tellers and malingerers than evaluators who did not use 
these methods. However, the mere quantity of details in symptoms reports could not serve as 
robust indicators of veracity (Akehurst et al., 2015). This suggests that the richness in details 
in symptoms report, the main idea behind CBCA method, is not diagnostic of honesty. 
One potentially promising avenue is a newly devised verbal lie detection method: The 
Verifiability Approach (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012). The Verifiability Approach is based on 
two aspects of deceptive strategies.  First, liars tend to provide statements that are rich in 
details, because they want to make a convincing impression and believe that detailed stories 
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sound convincing. Second, liars tend to avoid mentioning details that could be checked by 
investigators.As a solution to these conflicting strategies, liars, compared with truth tellers, 
typically provide fewer details that can be verified and more details that cannot be verified 
(Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a, b; Nahari & Vrij, 2014). 
Several Verifiabily Approach studies (Harvey, Vrij, Nahari, & Ludwig, 2016; Nahari 
et al., 2014b; Vrij et al., 2016) have examined the effect of informing participants, using an 
‘Information Protocol’, that the details of their statements could be subsequently checked by 
the interviewer. Across studies, this warning has resulted in an increased number of verifiable 
details being reported by truth tellers but not by liars, strengthening the efficiency of the 
Verifiability Approach. This warning, as part of the Verifiabilty Approach, has also facilitated 
discrimination between truths and lies in insurance claims settings (Harvey et al., 2016; Vrij 
et al., 2016). Most likely these instructions motivated truth tellers to search their memory for 
additional verifable details - something that is not possible for liars to do. 
The Verifiability Approach is a promising lie detection approach, but has not been 
applied in the context of malingering physical symptoms to date. Actually, research to date 
suggests that the efficacy of the Verifiablity Approach depends on the context in which it is 
used (Vrij, Nahari, Isitt, & Leal, 2016; Nahari et al., 2014). For example, in mock crimes 
scenarios, where an interviewer knows all the details of the ‘crime’, liars have difficulty in 
providing verifiable details. This is probably because liars are unable to demonstrate they 
were at a different location than the crime scene during the time the crime occurred. In 
contrast, in insurance claim cases, someone could falsely claim to have lost his phone while 
running, but could then truthfully describe his run. Therefore, liars determine themselves 
when an object is stolen or lost, which provides liars with more degrees of freedom to 
generate false verifiable details (Vrij et al., 2016; Nahari et al., 2014). This might also explain 
why the Verifiability Approach was not an effective strategy for discriminating between true 
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and false insurance claims (Nahari, Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, & Vernham, 2014). In case of 
malingering, the same problems might apply, such as the absence of the ground truth and the 
option to tell lies incorporated with previous truthfull experience of a specific symptom. 
Therefore, our two studies are a first attempt to explore the usefulness of this approach 
to the detection of malingering. We asked participants to write a statement reporting real or 
fabricated common physical symptoms, such as a headache or stomach ache (Petrie, Faasse, 
Crichton, & Grey, 2014). In the first study, participants were given the task to write a 
symptom report, while in the second study, they were informed that their statements may be 
checked by a medical professional. We predicted that in both studies, truth tellers would 
provide significantly more verifiable details about their symptoms than malingerers, whereas 
malingerers would include more non-verifiable details in their statements than truth tellers 
(Hypothesis 1). We also predicted that the proportion of verifiable details (verifiable details / 
total details) would be higher for truth tellers than for malingerers (Hypothesis 2). 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
We conducted an online study that included 125 undergraduate psychology students. 
Participants were 17 - 38 years of age, with an average age of 20 years (SD = 2.48). The 
majority were women (86%). 
From the total number of participants, 41 reported having real physical symptoms of 
different medical conditions (see Procedure), whereas 84 did not report any symptoms of 
physical ill-health. On the basis of these initial symptom reports, participants were allocated 
into two groups: truth tellers (with real symptoms) and malingerers (without symptoms). 
Procedure 
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After participants signed up for the study, they were directed to an online link to start 
the survey in Qualtrics. After answering demographic questions, participants were asked to 
report any physical symptoms of ill-health they were experiencing (‘Do you currently or did 
you in the last week suffer from any physical symptoms, such as a headache, stomachache, 
fatigue etc.?’). Participants who answered in the affirmative were considered as ‘truth tellers’, 
whereas participants who responded negatively to the question were next instructed to 
malinger. 
We presented the participants of both groups with 10 of the most frequent physical 
symptoms of ill-health reported in the general population (Petrie et al., 2014). Participants 
also could add additional symptoms if the illness they were experiencing was not on the list 
(no new symptoms were added). Malingerers were instructed to select one of the listed 
symptoms and to write a statement about the target symptom as though they suffered from it. 
They were presented with the following instructions: ‘Imagine that you suffer from this 
specific symptom and try to imagine all the details of experiencing that symptom of ill-health. 
Consider that you did not attend your exam because of this symptom. Imagine we are the 
exam committee asking you to provide us with specific details of the day on which you 
experienced the symptom. Give us a description of your behavior during the day you ‘had the 
symptom’. Your report should start with the morning in which you noticed the symptom and 
then proceed through the next hours until you went to bed.’ Truth tellers received a similar 
instruction, except that they were asked to give a chronological account of the last day they 
suffered from their symptom of ill-health. Both groups wrote reports about their symptoms. 
No length nor time limitations were imposed. Table 1 shows the frequencies of selected 
symptoms for truth tellers and malingerers. 
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After truth tellers and malingerers had written their statements, we asked them to 
evaluate the difficulty of this task on 7-point Likert scale (1 = very easy; 7= very difficult). 
They were then thanked for participation and rewarded with one research credit. 
-Insert table 1 about here-
Coding 
All statements were coded by one coder, and the second coder scored a randomly 
selected 20% of all statements. Both coders were blind to the veracity of the statements. We 
coded for the presence of the following details, all derived from the Reality Monitoring 
literature (Johnson & Raye, 1981): Perceptual (i.e., information about what a person has seen, 
smelt, heard or felt); Spatial (i.e., information about spatial arrangement of objects or people); 
Temporal (i.e., information about the time when a behavior/action happened, an event 
happened or a sequence of events/behaviors happened), and descriptive (i.e., specific 
description of action, objects or symptoms) details. Every word describing a symptom 
(‘headache’, ‘stomachache’, ‘pain’, ‘fatigue’), emotional feeling (‘I feel’, ‘anxiety’, ‘scared’), 
internal experience or state (‘worried’, ‘decided’, ‘I wished/wanted’, ‘thirsty’, ‘tired’), or 
information about what a person saw, heared or tasted (‘I saw red dots’, ‘noise’, ‘bitter’), was 
coded as a perceptual detail. Spatial codes included every detail about where an event 
happened (‘at home’, ‘in the streets’, ‘at car’), or about spatial arrangements of people or 
objects (‘upstairs/ downstairs’, ‘down’, ‘up’, ‘in front’). Temporal details included 
information about the time in general (‘at noon’, ‘midnight’, ‘day’), or about a specific time 
(‘at 13h’), or time sequences of the events (‘before’, ‘after’, ‘during’, ‘the next day’, 
‘previously’). 
We also coded descriptions of actions and objects. Every description of an action 
(‘took an Aspirin 500mg’, ‘called a doctor’, ‘talked to my friend’), symptom (‘strong’, 
‘sharp’, ‘coming in waves’), or object (‘shiny’ ) was coded as descriptive detail. 
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Following Nahari and Vrij (2014), all details were coded either as verifiable or non-
verifiable. For a detail to be coded as verifiable, it had to meet one of the following criteria. 
The activities 1) were documented (appointment with a doctor, prescriptions, receipt etc.) and, 
therefore, potentially checkable; 2) involved an action carried out together with (an) other 
identified person(s) rather than alone or with a stranger who could not easily be traced; 3) 
pertained to something that was witnessed by (an) other identified person(s); 4) were reported 
as being recorded (e.g. on CCTV) by the interviewee; 5) used technology (use of cash 
machine, bank cards, phone, tablet, computer); or 6) could potentially be checked by blood 
analysis and medical tests (taking specific pills). 
To examine the inter-rater reliabilities between coders intraclass correlation 
coefficients (ICC) were calculated. They were excellent for verifiable (ICC = .98) and non-
verifiable details (ICC = .94), as well as for the total sum of details (ICC = .94). Regarding the 
separate categories of detail, except for spatial details (ICC = .63), the majority of ICC’s 
indicated almost perfect agreement (all ICC’s > .84; see supplemental Table 1). As we did not 
formulate hypotheses about the different detail categories, we only report descriptives 
pertaining to details in the Results section. 
Results 
Difficulty of the task 
To check whether truth tellers might have found the task less difficult than malingerers 
an independent t-test was conducted. However, truth tellers and malingerers reported similar 
difficulty levels, means being 4.10 (SD = 1.39) and 4.46 (SD = 1.40), respectively, t (123) = 
1.36, p = .18). 
Length of the statements 
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On average, participants produced 89.26 words per statement. Truth tellers provided 
significantly shorter statements (M = 66.71, SD = 48.76) than malingerers (M = 100.27, SD = 
83.52), t (123) = 2.38, p = .02,d = .49. 
Numberof verifiable and non-verifiable details 
The difference between truth tellers (M = .93, SD = 2.26) and malingerers (M = .45, 
SD = 1.61) in number of verifiable details reported was not significant, t (123) = 1.34, p = .18, 
d = .25). However, truth tellers reported significantly less non-verifiable details (M = 18.83, 
SD = 10.43) than malingerers (M = 28.29, SD = 21.32), t (123) = 2.69, p = .01; d = .56, which 
partially supports Hypothesis 1. 
Proportions of verifiable details 
Verifiable details were reported by 16.8% of participants. Of the total number of 
provided details, verifiable information comprised 2.4%. Calculating the proportion of 
verifiable details (verifiable details / total of details), truth tellers had significantly higher 
proportions (M = .05, SD = .12) than malingerers (M = .01, SD = .03), t (123) = 2.43, p = .01, 
d = .46. This result supports Hypothesis 2. 
Number of (verifiable and non-verifiable) perceptual, spatial, temporal, and descriptive 
details 
Exploring the potential differences between groups in different categories of details, 
we found that truth tellers (M = .83, SD = 1.96) provided a significantly higher number of 
descriptive verifiable details than malingerers (M = .32, SD = 1.01), t (123) = 1.91, p = .03, d 
= .33. However, truth tellers reported significantly less (M = 4.22, SD = 3.63) perceptual non-
verifiable details, t (123) = 4.30, p = .001, d = .86, than malingerers (M = 8.09, SD = 5.18). 
The same was found for descriptive non-verifiable details, truthtellers M = 10.66 (SD = 6.14), 
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11 
malingerers M =14.85 (SD = 13.01), t (123) = 1.95, p = .02, d = .41,  (see supplemental Table 
2 and 3). 
Study 2 
The results of Study 1 revealed that malingerers used longer statements richer in non-
verifiable details.  Truth tellers produced higher proportions of verifiable details than 
malingerers – although the proportion of verifiable details produced was low in both 
conditions . Thus, our results are in line with previous studies on the Verifiability Approach 
(Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari et al., 2014a, b) and also suggest that low verifiability reports 
might be a feature of people who malinger suffering from physical symptoms. Therefore, in 
Study 2 we tested whether differences in verifiability between truth tellers and liars would 
become more pronounced when participants are given additional instructions about verifiable 
details, as was found in previous studies (see Nahari et al., 2014b; Vrij et al., 2016; Harvey et 
al., 2016). 
Method 
Participants 
105 undergraduate psychology students were recruited. Participants’ age ranged from 
18 to 26 years, with an average of 20 years (SD = 1.48). The majority were women (74%). 
From the total number of participants, 38 reported to having physical symptoms, while 
67 denied suffering from any physical condition. Therefore, as in the previous study, 
participants were allocated to two groups: truth tellers (with real symptoms) and malingerers 
(fabricating an account of symptoms). 
Procedure 
Study 2 followed a similar procedure as Study 1. Participants had an option to choose 
one of ten symptoms from the list or to add a new one (see Table 1). However, unlike our first 
study, before starting with writing the statements about their symptoms, the participants were 
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given an ‘Information Protocol’, which informed them that the details they provide may be 
checked (as in Harvey et al., 2016). The Information Protocol explicitly outlined what kind of 
information is considered a verifiable detail: ‘We know from research that liars prefer to 
avoid providing details that can be verified whereas truth tellers prefer to provide verifiable 
details. Therefore, we are going to give your statement to medical professionals and ask them 
to decide if your statement is truthful, based on the extent to which the details you provide can 
be verified. Verifiable details are activities that can be documented and therefore verifiable 
(phone calls, doctor appointment, prescriptions etc., or activities that could be checked 
through blood analysis and medical documentation), carried out with another person (that can 
be identified), witnessed by another person (identifiable person), or recorded by CCTV 
cameras. Details that do not meet any of these criteria are considered to be unverifiable.’ 
After writing the statement, using 5-point Likert scales (1 = completely unmotivated; 5 
= strongly motivated), we asked participants how motivated they had been to write down a 
convincing statement and to what extent they thought to have succeeded in this. Participants 
were also asked to report how strongly they believed that the details they provided would be 
checked by researchers on 5-point Likert scale (1= definitely no; 5 = definitely yes). 
We asked malingerers whether they had been using bluffing as a strategy in writing 
their statements. Bluffing was defined as providing false verifiable details. The possible 
answers were ‘Yes’,’Maybe’, and ‘No’. Perhaps the easiest way of bluffing is to confabulate 
about a person who can confirm the story (Culhane, Hosch, & Kehn, 2008). In this context, 
this might be a person who the individual claims has witnessed them experiencing the 
symptoms or who they have confided in about their symptoms. Therefore, to investigate 
wheather malingerers refer to false witnesses, we coded every statement in which a close 
person (parents, girlfriend/boyfriend, flatmate) was mentioned. After finishing the task, all 
participants were thanked for participating and rewarded with one research credit. 
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Coding 
As in Study 1, all statements were coded by one coder, while the second coder scored 
a randomly selected 20% of all statements. Both coders were blind to the veracity of 
statements. The ICC’s between coders was excellent for verifiable details (ICC = .94), non-
verifiable details (ICC = .97), and for the total sum of details (ICC = .98). The ICC’s for other 
categories of details also indicated good agreement (all ICC’s > .80; see supplemental Table 
1). 
Results 
Motivation, estimation of success, difficulty of the task, and belief that statements will be 
checked 
Truth tellers reported (M = 3.53, SD = .79) a comparable level of motivation as 
malingerers (M = 3.43, SD = .80), t (103) =.57, p = .57. Also, the truth tellers (M = 3.53 SD = 
.76) did not differ from malingerers (M = 3.31 (SD = .96) in how they rated their success, t 
(103) = 1.17, p = .24. As in Study 1, difficulty of the task was rated on a 7-point Likert scale.
Truth tellers (M = 3.76, SD = 1.28) and malingerers (M = 3.42, SD = 1.29) did not differ with 
respect to their difficulty ratings, t (103) = 1.32, p = .19. 
Both truth tellers (M = 3.50, SD = .89) and malingerers (M = 3.15, SD = .96) were 
moderately convinced in the possibility that the veracity of their statements will be checked, 
and the difference between groups was not significant, t (103) = 1.85, p = .07. 
Length of the statements 
On average, participants produced 142.47 words per statement. The length of the 
statements was not significantly different for truth tellers (M = 152.63, SD = 111.16) and 
malingerers (M = 136.70, SD = 85.29), t (103) = .82, p = .41. 
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Number of verifiable and non-verifiable details 
Truth tellers (M = 8.26, SD = 15.31) and malingerers (M = 6.66, SD = 9.02) did not 
differ in number of generated verifiable details, t (103) = .68, p = .50. The group difference in 
number of non-verifiable details was not significant either, t (103) = .63, p = .53, with truth 
tellers (M = 48.92,SD = 32.76) and malingerers (M = 45.03,SD = 29.44) producing a 
comparable number of such details. 
Proportions of verifiable details 
The number of participants providing verifiable details was much higher than in study 
1 (57.1% vs. 16.8%). Verifiable details formed 13.1% (2.4% in study 1) of the overall number 
of details in all statements. The average proportion of verifiable details (verifiable details / 
total of details) was .12 (SD = .15) for truth tellers, and .13 (SD = .12) for malingerers; this 
difference was not significant, t (103) = .30, p = .77. 
- Insert Table 2 about here -
 Bluffing as a strategy 
From the total number of malingerers, 17 participants (25.4%) reported that they 
‘maybe’ had used bluffing, while 19 malingerers (28.4%) admitted providing false verifiable 
details. From a total of 41 malingerers who provided (false) verifiable details, 63.4% 
mentioned a close person who could confirm their story. On the other hand, 57.9% of truth 
tellers also provided information about family members or close people who could confirm 
their story. The association between veracity and  frequency of mentioning close people was 
not significant, X²(1) = 1.03, p = .31. 
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Number of (verifiable and non-verifiable) perceptual, spatial, temporal, and descriptive 
details 
Truth tellers produced significantly more spatial verifiable details (M = .87, SD = 2.07) 
than malingerers (M = .15, SD = .44), t (103) = 2.75, p = .01, d = .48
1
. A similar pattern was
observed for the number of spatial non-verifiable details, t (103) = 2.67, p = .001,d = .51, with 
truth tellers generating more information about locations or spatial arrangement of people and 
objects (M = 2.79, SD = 3.04) than malingerers (M = 1.52, SD = 1.82). Group differences with 
regard to the other details categories did not reach significance (see supplemental Table 2 and 
3). 
Discussion 
We examined whether the Verifiability Approach (Nahari & Vrij, 2014) could 
differentiate between people who are suffering from common physical symptoms and those 
who are malingering such symptoms. The main findings of our studies can be summarized as 
follows: Truth tellers included a higher proportion of verifiable details despite generating 
shorter statements than malingerers, which supports the Verifiability Approach. However, this 
effect only emerged in Study 1 where participants were not provided with an instruction to 
include verifiable detail. When the instruction was provided (Study 2), no difference between 
truth tellers and malingerers in non/verifiable details emerged. These results appear to indicate 
that the instruction weakened the effect of the Verifiability Approach - unlike in previous 
studies where the use of such an instruction enhanced the differences between truthful and 
deceptive accounts. This discrepancy suggests that detecting malingerers using the 
Verifiability Approach may be more effective if the patients are required to provide their 
1
Because of the low number of participants in both groups, we also calculated a Mann-Whitney U test (U test = 
1052.00, z = 2.04, p = .02), which also yielded a significant result.
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reports spontaneously – rather than warning them that their reports will be examined for 
verifiable details. 
We believe this discrepancy in findings is related to different levels of difficulty to 
incorporate false verifable details into an account in this specific setting. Note that bluffers 
always run the risk that the investigator will actually check their account. When they are not 
fully convinced that their statements will be reviewed - which we checked and found in study 
2 – they might be more prone to bluffing because the risk of being caught seems low. The 
most popular way of bluffing reported in the current research was claiming that another 
person could confirm the account, most frequently a person closely related to malingerer (e.g., 
parents, boyfriend, flatmate) (see also Culhane et al., 2008). Actually, mentioning close 
people as witnesses is a clever strategy because the majority of people are willing to 
corroborate a statement of a close friend or relative in order to help that person (Hosch et al., 
2011). 
However, providing false witnesses might be much more convinient in one context 
than in the other settings. For example, in a criminal setting, asking a friend to provide a false 
alibi is a risky approach. The criminal needs to inform the friend beforehand to pretend that 
s/he was with or spoke with the criminal, which means that the friend will be aware of the 
falsehood of criminal’s statement. Criminals may be reluctant to do this, and if they are, they 
are unlikely to mention the friend during the interview. The same applies to insurance 
settings, because if a fraudulent claimant is using a false witness, that person would also have 
to be informed about the false scenario they have to report and confirm in the statement. 
Consistent with this, Vrij et al. (2016) found that only 17% of liars reported discussing the 
incident with the person they mentioned in their statements, compared with 77% of truth 
tellers. In a malingering situation, it is easier to actually fool friends because common 
physical symptoms are often not clearly visible to others. Therefore, even if a friend denied 
Page 16 of 27Psychology, Crime and Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
17 
noticing a malingerer’s headache, the malingering would not necessarily be exposed as 
headaches are often not visible from someone’s actions, and people often do not mention to 
others that they have a headache. In sum, bluffers may think it is easier to get away with false 
witnesses in malingering situations than in criminal and insurance settings. Further, when 
asked to rate the difficulty of writing the (false/true) statements, malingerers did not differ 
from truth tellers. This may indicate that providing false potentially checkable information did 
not pose a big challenge for malingerers. 
Another point to be addressed concerns the length of the statements between groups in 
both studies. While truth tellers spontaneously wrote significantly shorter statements than 
malingerers, when we provided the Information Protocol, the difference was lost. Similar to 
these findings are the results of previous insurance claims studies in which researchers 
suggested that providing a detailed model statement about an unrelated topic would elicit 
more verbal clues of deception, such as longer and more detailed reports among truth tellers 
than among liars. However, the results showed that, even with the model statement, liars 
provided the same length of statements as truth tellers (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Verham, & 
Fisher, 2013). 
The main disadvantage of the Verifiability Approach in a medico-legal context seems 
to be the low spontaneous production rate for verifiable details in genuine patients’ report. 
The percentage of truth tellers who reported verifiable details in Study 1 was around 17%, 
while it was 57.1% in Study 2 following instructions to provide such details. This suggests 
that the majority of genuine patients experiencing physical symptoms of ill-health do not 
spontaneously provide checkable details.  It is also possible that they simply might not have 
any checkable to report about. In the context of symptoms, the majority of information 
provided by patients is subjective, and mostly concentrated on their internal state, rather than 
on external or visible condition. Thus, the situations in which professionals have the option to 
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verify persons’ symptoms complaints via cameras or witnesses may be extremely rare 
(Resnick et al., 2008). Additionally, people differ in the way they perceive their symptoms 
and behave when experiencing them (see Kolk, Hanewald, Schagen, & van Wijk, 2003; see 
also van Wijk, Huisman, & Kolk,1999). While one person may immediately calls a doctor or 
goes to the pharmacy, another person may just stay in their office, without complaining to 
anybody. Both persons are truth tellers, but the second one would not have any verifiable 
details to report concerning their physical symptoms of ill-health. 
One important limitation of the current study is that we relied on self-reports for the 
selection of truth tellers and malingerers, without any independent check as to whether they 
actually suffered from the reported symptoms or not. However, the incidence of selected 
symptoms amongst truth tellers was consistent with previous research about symptoms most 
frequently experienced by non-malingers (see Petry et al, 2014; Dandachi-FitzGerald & 
Merckelbach, 2013). 
Future Research 
We do not exlude the possibility that, with certain adjustments, it may be possible to 
extend the Verifiability Approach into an efficient tool for the detection of malingering of 
physical symptoms. The adjustments should focus on making both malingerers and truth 
tellers more convinced that their statements will be checked, such as presenting the ‘warning’ 
that their statements will be checked multiple times during the reporting phase. It is 
reasonable to assume that if malingerers are sure that their reports will be questioned, they 
will be less willing to provide false verifiable details. Aditionally, the warning could include 
‘consequences’ for such an act, because in reality people are confronted with losses if it is 
established that they malingered. However, such a warning could also influence truth tellers, 
who then will realize that they could be seen as malingerers, and they therefore may feel the 
need to write plausible statements. 
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Table 1. Frequencies and percentage of selected symptoms in truth tellers and instructed 
malingerers in both studies. 
Symptoms 
Study 1 Study 2 
Truth tellers 
n (%) 
Malingerers 
n (%) 
Truth tellers 
n (%) 
Malingerers 
n (%) 
Back or neck pain 13 (31.7) 10 (11.9) 12 (31.6) 8 (11.9) 
Headache 10 (24.4) 35 (41.7) 9 (23.7) 23 (34.3) 
Fatigue or loss of energy 8 (19.5) 19 (22.6) 6 (15.8) 15 (22.6) 
Upset stomach or indigestion 5 (12.2) 5 (5.9) 5 (13.2) 7 (10.4) 
Insomnia or sleeping problems 2 (4.9) 10 (11.9) 1 (2.6) 5 (7.5) 
Congested or runny nose 1 (2.4) 2 (2.4) 0 1 (1.5) 
Joint pain or stiffness 1 (2.4) 0 1 (2.6) 0 
Cough 1 (2.4) 0 1 (2.6) 4 (6.0) 
Muscle pain 0 3 (3.6) 0 1 (1.5) 
Low blood pressure or circulation problems 0 0 0 2 (3.0) 
Added symptoms: 
- Vertigo 0 0 0 1 (1.5) 
- Intestine pain 0 0 1 (2.6) 0 
- Knee pain 0 0 1 (2.6) 0 
- Sore throat 0 0 1 (2.6) 0 
Total 41 (100) 84 (100) 38(100) 67(100) 
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Table 2. Length of the statements, difficulty of the task, non-verifiable and verifiable details, 
in study 1 and study 2. 
Group N 
Length of the 
statements 
M (SD) 
Difficulty of 
the task 
M (SD) 
Number of 
non-verifiable 
details 
M (SD)
Proportion of 
verifiable 
details 
M (SD) 
Study 1 
Truth tellers 41 66.71 (48.76) 4.10 (1.39) 10.43 (1.62) .05 (.12) 
Malingerers 84 100.27 (83.52)* 4.46 (1.40) 21.32 (2.33) .01 (.03) 
Sign. * / ** * 
Study 2 
Truth tellers 37 152.63 (111.16) 3.76 (1.28) 48.92 (32.76) .12 (.15) 
Malingerers 68 136.7 (85.29) 3.42 (1.29) 45.03 (29.44) .13 (.12) 
Sign. / / / / 
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; Length of the statements is calculated as sum of words; Difficulty of 
the task was graded using 7-point Likert scale; Proportion of verifiable details was calculated as 
verifiable details/ total details. Bonferroni post hoc correction was applied. 
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